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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of rate privacy in the context of wireless sensor networks. Our
discussion reveals that the concept indeed is of a great importance for the privacy preservation of such
networks. As a result, we propose a buffering scheme to protect the rate from adversaries. Simulation
results verify the applicability of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of privacy preservation in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has attracted many
research studies during past few years [1]. Two types of privacy have been discussed in the
literature; data-oriented privacy and context-oriented privacy. While data-oriented approaches
protect the privacy of the content of the sensed data, context-oriented privacy schemes focus
on preservation of the context information such as the location of sensors or the time when an
event message is generated i.e., temporal privacy [2].
There are two previous studies that have considered the temporal privacy in WSNs. Kamat et.
al., [2] propose a buffering approach maintained at intermediate nodes along the routing path,
to inject delay and as a result obfuscate the creation time of each message from the adversary.
Using their approach, the adversary cannot extract the exact time when the source node sensed
the event which prevents the revelation of many critical information about the target. Hong et. al.,
[3] argue that by detecting the relation between upstream and downstream traffic an adversary
can trace the routing path to the region of interest such as the location of base-station. So they
propose a random delaying strategy in order to hide the timing correlation between the two
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2streams. Each node randomly delays each received message in a way that it mixes the order of
the messages. Both studies consider that the delay follows the exponential distribution.
The above studies protect network’s temporal privacy. However, there are some situations in
which the answer to the questions like: “How often a particular event occurs?” or “At which
rate the event occurs?” also is a part of the network owners’ privacy. For example, consider a
factory that has installed a WSN at its production lines. Every time the line finalizes a product
an assigned sensor node generates a message to inform the base-station. Realizing the rate at
which the factory produces its products is of a great importance for its competitors as they
can obtain valuable knowledge e.g., they can predict the market. Another example would be a
WSN installed for surveillance purposes at the gates of a garrison. Having the knowledge of the
rate at which soliders enter the gates along with some side information results in the ability to
determine the number of soliders. Moreover, the enemy can find a time interval during which
(with high probability) no one appears at the gate.
Assume that the message flow obeys Poisson distribution with parameter λ. An adversary
can eavesdrop the channel and sample the message transmission rate. She can estimate λ using
the sample mean. It has been proved that the sample mean of the Poisson distribution is a
minimum-variance unbiased estimator as its estimation variance achieves the Cramer-Rao lower
bound [4].
No other study has elaborated on the temporal privacy of WSN other than the two work
mentioned earlier in this paper and neither of these studies can hide the rate from the adversary.
In fact, as they consider exponential service time the output is a Poisson process of the same
rate (Burke’s theorem [4]).
This paper introduces the concept of rate privacy in WSNs. To the best of our knowledge, no
such concept has ever been discussed in the literature. The paper provides a method to protect
the actual rate from the adversary.
II. THE PROPOSED METHOD
There are two trivial solutions to hide the rate, as follows:
1) Deterministic message generation: Each node constantly senses the area, however, it gener-
ates the corresponding messages only in deterministic time intervals e.g., every 10 minutes.
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Fig. 1: An example of sensor nodes in a routing path. Shaded boxes depict occupied slots in
each buffer
This approach is not adapted to the sensing events. Large intervals delay the message while
small delay intervals burden worthless traffic to the network.
2) Randomized dummy messages: This approach increases the energy consumption as every
node periodically generates dummy messages.
Motivated by the shortcomings of the approaches described above, we present a rate-privacy
preservation scheme as follows. Consider that the network is secured and an adversary neither
has intention nor has the ability to decrypt the messages. However, the adversary stays near the
base-station and eavesdrops the traffic originated from the region in order to estimate the rate
without decrypting the messages. All of the sensor nodes independently generate sensing reports
using constant size packets, and route these packets using hop-by-hop routing fashion toward
the base-station.
In our approach we assume that every node maintains a buffer of size q and each message is
buffered in intermediate nodes along the routing path from a source node to the base-station. We
change the buffering scheme from First-In-First-Out (FIFO) to a randomized approach using a
probability distribution such as uniform distribution. In this scheme, upon reception of a message
instead of placing it at the end of the queue, the receiver places the message in one of the empty
slots of the buffer uniformly at random. Each node retrieves the first message in the buffer
after a random delay that follows the exponential distribution with (µ) and forwards it toward
the base-station. Fig. 1 shows an example of such scheme. Node X senses the area, generates
report messages with rate λ and routes them toward the base-station through its neighbor which
is the node Y . Upon reception, Y places the received message in one of the empty slots with
probability 1/(q − i) where i is equal to the number of occupied slots. This approach not only
preserves the temporal privacy of the network (as it delays every message) but also protects the
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(a) Buffer length versus the estimated rate
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(b) Buffer length versus the average message latency
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(c) Simulation time versus the estimated rate
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(d) Inter-arrival time versus average estimation error
Fig. 2: Simulation results
rate from the adversary. We leave the modeling of this approach to our future work.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our proposed approach has been implemented in Castalia simulator [5]. Castalia is a discrete
event simulator for sensor networks based on OMENT++ [6]. Numerous validation experiments
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presented for limited number of scenarios. We assumed collision-free packet transmission where
100 nodes are scattered in a 100× 100 m2 area. Moreover, we assumed that the adversary stays
near the base-station and observes every received message.
Fig. 2(a) shows the effect of buffer size on the adversary’s estimated rate when the inter-arrival
time equals to 5 seconds. The wider interquartile range of the larger buffers confirms that the
probability that the adversary correctly estimates the rate reduces significantly as the buffer size
grows. Fig. 2(b) shows the average message latency when buffer length increases.
Fig. 2(c) depicts the snapshot of the last 300 seconds of the simulation when the inter-arrival
time is 5 and the buffer size is 20. We assumed that the adversary samples the inter-arrival times
during the entire simulation time. It can be observed that as the sample size grows the estimation
becomes more accurate, however, the size of the first quartile suggests that with high probability
the estimated rate at most reaches to a value which is 2 times greater than the actual rate.
Fig. 2(d) compares the average estimation error when the inter-arrival rate varies, for two
different cases; our proposed scheme and a FIFO-based buffering approach [2]. It can be realized
that in the latter case the estimation error is negligible. However, the average error in our approach
is significantly greater which prevents the adversary from successfully estimating the actual rate.
Also note that the error increases when the inter-arrival rate raises which is mainly due to the
smaller sample size of uncrowded networks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper the concept of rate-privacy in wireless sensor networks is introduced. We
presented a buffering approach that preserves both rate and temporal privacy. Our next steps
target to elaborate on the mathematical modeling of the proposed approach. Also, rate-privacy
protection in realtime sensor networks is a good direction for future studies.
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